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摘  要 
 





















































































Executive turnover and its link to firm performance have been the focus of a 
large and growing literature because they provide a crucial measure of the 
effectiveness with which a firm solves two principal–agent problems. A magnitude of 
publication on this field provided us a solid basis for further study. In China, the 
internal disciplinary mechanism that determines CEO turnover is particularly 
important due to the lack of effective markets for corporate control. In addition, due to 
our legal system is relatively underdeveloped and inefficient, and the ownership 
structure, the corporate governance is relatively poor. The two principal–agent 
problems are very acute, thus corporate governance problem is becoming an 
important problem that China’s listed companies is facing with. This paper try to 
begin with the turnover of top management of China’s listed companies, by searching 
the information of top management turnover, direct of board, corporate performance 
etc. , basing on prior researchers’ theories and related literature, to estimate the link 
between executive turnover and firm performance in Chinese listed firms and provide 
systematic evidence of the turnover-performance sensitivities of top executives, and 
this paper hope to find out the corporate governance problems in China’s listed firms. 
Finally, some preliminary policy suggestions are given. 
This paper is arranged in six chapters. Each chapter’s content is as following: 
Chapter 1 is an introduction of this paper. This chapter explains the reason for 
choosing this topic to research, what this paper’s content was and the research method 
of this paper. 
Chapter 2 is a general review on the research literatures related to the change of 
top management. After gathered research literatures related to the link between top 
management turnover and corporate performance and corporate governance, this 
chapter classified them and summarized them, as a literature basis for this paper. 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework for this paper. This thesis introduces 
the classical principal-agent theory, corporate governance theory and corporate 
control mechanism theory, as the starting point of my research; This thesis also 
introduces some related laws and regulations, in order to make the reader know the 
regulation background of top management change in China.  















management turnovers. This part introduces the select of sample, the source of data, 
the trend of top management turnover and the reason of top management etc. From 
those, we can find some clew about corporate governance of China’s listed firms. 
Chapter 5 is the core of this paper. Based on the literatures and theory, and the 
general analysis of top management turnovers in China’s listed companies, using 
econometrics method, this paper made an empirical analysis on the link between top 
management turnover and corporate performance and listed all the regression results. 
Chapter 6 gives a general summary about the above findings, and brought forward 
some preliminary policy recommendations on how to improve corporate governance. 
Some limitation of this paper and future research issues are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
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 第一章  前言 
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据博思艾伦咨询公司 2005 年发布的调查报告显示，自 1995 年到 2004 年，
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分离，是 CEO 出现的原因。CEO 制度的意义，就是这个职位为企业更有效率的经
营管理开辟了新途径。CEO 不是企业的出资人，但却拥有很大的权利。近年来，
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